Following numerous sightings over New Jersey, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security held a joint hearing Tuesday to examine the full scope of the homeland security threats posed by unauthorized, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or drones. Testimony was provided by Keith Jones, deputy executive assistant commissioner of Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO); Robert W. Wheeler Jr., assistant director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Critical Incident Response Group; and Brad Wiegmann, deputy assistant attorney general for national security at the Department of Justice (DOJ). Cathy Lanier, the chief security officer for the National Football League (NFL), was unable to attend but provided written testimony.
In the hearing, the DOJ and FBI witnesses left Congress and the American people with few answers on the mysterious sightings over New Jersey. However, it is clear that in the wrong hands, drone technology has the potential to negatively impact the essential mission of law enforcement agencies, disrupt our critical infrastructure or mass-spectator events such as NFL games, and even surveil sensitive U.S. military sites. This is especially true in the event that state and local law enforcement do not have the authorities needed to swiftly mitigate the threat. Earlier this year, the House Homeland Security, House Transportation and Infrastructure, and House Judiciary Committees introduced the bipartisan Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act of 2024, Congress’ strongest effort, to date, to build a counter-drone framework that will empower federal, state, and covered local law enforcement agencies to swiftly detect, track, and mitigate hostile drone use.
In testimony submitted for the record, Lanier wrote:
“In the six years since my earlier testimony, we have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of threats, incidents, and incursions by unauthorized drones, especially over the last four years. In 2022, we experienced 2,537 rogue drone flights into the restricted air space above stadiums during NFL games, and in 2023, the number of incursions grew to 2,845. To put these numbers in context, when I testified in 2018, we had tracked about a dozen incursions by drones at stadiums during games in the 2017 season. In the 2018 season, we tracked 67 drone incursions at games.”
“This stadium and sporting event flight restriction is well-established and geographically and temporally limited. The [Federal Aviation Administration] FAA has a thorough and robust process for considering and approving waivers, which has effectively served the sports organizations, broadcast operators, and others for more than two decades. State and local law enforcement officials, however, still lack the authority to enforce the longstanding TFRs by taking action against rogue drones. Our national security and intelligence agencies continue to warn that terrorist groups and other bad non-state actors consider stadiums and other mass gatherings attractive targets for attack.”
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence Chairman August Pfluger (R-TX) asked Wheeler about the sightings over New Jersey, to which Wheeler responded:
“The Bureau is actively investigating the situation you mentioned, the unexplained sighting of drone activity over that part of New Jersey, including in proximity to sensitive sites and areas of concern. We do not attribute that to an individual or a group yet. We’re investigating, but I don’t have an answer of who’s responsible for that—if one or more people that are responsible for those drone flights. But we’re actively investigating. What the Bureau has done to aid our state and local partners is what we generally do—enlist the help of the interagency, enlist the help of the public––there’s a tip line at 1-800-CALL-FBI––tips from the public could help us resolve this. It is concerning—”
Chairman Pfluger pressed:
“Are we concerned that there are nefarious intentions that could cause either national security or a public safety incident that would put Americans at risk?”
Wheeler answered:
“There is nothing that is known that would lead me to say that, but we just don’t know, and that’s the concerning part.”
Pfluger continued:
“Last year, there were incidents, including Langley Air Force Base, where for over a week we had unknown drones flying over a very sensitive military installation with F-22s and other weapons systems on the ground. I think that was cause for concern…You mentioned, Mr. Wheeler, that we don’t necessarily have the authorities we need. Why can’t we take action against these drones that are flying over sensitive sites?”
Wheeler answered:
“So, the authority exists to mitigate a UAS in flight when authorized, and that could certainly apply to a sensitive site. I would be a little measured in speaking for the Department of Defense for those sites that are in question here. But I will say that we’re, for the FBI, in a position a close liaison relationship with the Department of Defense and those areas that you mentioned, and we will help in every way possible.”
Chairman Pfluger then asked Jones about the threats from drones piloted by cartels at the Southwest border:
“I was down in the [Rio Grande Valley] last year and they told me that they had over 20,000 incidents, just in a quarter, [by] drones that were being operated by cartels. What’s the danger along the southern border to the safety of our citizens from drones?”
Jones answered:
“The volume of activity within the 500 yards of our contiguous border in the south and even on the north is staggering. We have deployed detection technology…The significant threat is counter-surveillance. [Cartels] are surveilling law enforcement activities. They’re doing this 24-7, 365. Historically, they’ve had to have high ground or terrain. Now, everywhere is the high ground.”
Chairman Pfluger continued:
“Do you have the authority to mitigate those physically or by other means?”
Jones concluded:
“The secretary has designated certain areas along our border as a covered facility. So yes, the capability exists and the authority exists in those covered areas…For example, last year, if we look at 45,000 detections on the Southwest [border], of those 2,500, plus or minus, actually made an incursion. So now we’re talking about a very small subset––a lot of the surveillance is taking place outside of our jurisdiction in foreign airspace. That makes it particularly challenging for mitigation.”
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL) noted the national security threat posed by drones manufactured in Communist China:
“We know that the cartels, especially the Mexican cartels, are working with the CCP, the Communist Chinese Party. The CCP provides the chemicals to the cartels who then produced the fentanyl that’s killing thousands of Americans every single year…Do we see any links between China and the drones, the technology that’s being used to surveil our border, and is being used to help the cartels in their quest to transport people, drugs, guns, everything into the United States.”
Jones answered:
“It’s no secret that the preponderance of the UAS technology is manufactured in China, and that the cartels are using that very technology. We share your concerns. There is a reason why we don’t use Chinese drones––because they knowingly or unknowingly are potentially collecting information for the government of China.”
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability Chairman Dan Bishop (R-NC) asked witnesses about counter-drone operations and the authorities needed to conduct them:
“I noted one thing when you were testifying, you said that the reason you need expanded authorities is that the effective technologies to deal with this could violate laws on intercepting aircraft in flight and intercepting transmissions…Maybe you could just help me understand a little bit better. If you’ve got like a mass-spectator event, which is one thing that’s been raised…Why not just have a rule that anybody who flies a drone near a mass-spectator event, the drone is going to be destroyed in the air. Is that something that would be hard to do? And then, why do you need to intercept data in order to do that?”
Wiegmann answered:
“If you had, let’s say, a football game and you would have a perimeter, it would be declared as a temporary flight restricted area. So around that, you’re going to have a buffer zone, you have an area that is a no-go. And then you have a larger area around that where you might want to detect what’s flying, and then you have a larger area around that where you might be tracking, but regular commercial drone use is okay. So, as they’re getting closer and closer to the facility, you’re detecting originally the signals to see what is that drone. You’re trying to identify the drone.
“So, is that a UPS drone that’s just delivering a package somewhere? Let it go on its way. Is it getting closer right into the zone where you’re just going to have to do something against it? So, it’s kind of a calibrated thing, and as you get closer and closer, then that’s where you take the opportunity to use the technology to jam it, most frequently, rather than destroy the drone. You’re interfering with its navigation in a way that confuses it. It requires it to land.”
Chairman Bishop continued:
“Should the average person looking at this, or the average Congressman trying to understand it, believe that these technologies where you can use electronics to force the device to land are successful or have a high degree of reliability?”
Jones answered, highlighting the need for law enforcement to retrieve information from a downed malicious drone:
“There are also non-destructive kinetic capabilities. So, one thing from a law enforcement perspective that we have to remember is that if we can capture a drone, there’s a forensic capability that allows us to glean information. That’s important to us, as well as avoiding or minimizing any collateral damage. We have to be very careful with any application of force in public areas.”
Chairman Bishop then asked about the privacy concerns with certain counter-drone authorities, to which Wiegmann answered:
“It’s important to recognize that when you talk about intercepting signals and so forth, as I mentioned in my opening statement [and] as assistant director Wheeler just mentioned, the types of signals that we’re getting are the same types of information that is actually required to be broadcast, and that anyone can pick up with a drone today as [with] the FAA’s rule…Because it’s really just about the communications between the drone and the controller, so that we can figure out––where is that person, what’s the registration, what’s the model, how do we deal with it?”
Representative Eli Crane (R-AZ) asked Wheeler what he knows so far about the sightings over New Jersey, to which Wheeler answered:
“So [from] the public reports and what we have from eyewitness sightings, some of those very credible police personnel and others, are what we describe as unidentified drones. We do not know the particular specifics of what those drones are. Some are described as being slightly larger than a commercially available drone, fixed wing as well as rotary. We have helped analyze, with our partners, video and pictures of what those look like that have been submitted. Part of that is these over 3,000 tips from the public…We don’t know the people responsible behind that, and that’s what we’re working on.”
